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The planned Geneva conference will attempt to end the Syrian
conflict with a political agreement. Such an agreement has to
define a transitional order that accommodates the different
groups’ interests. Meanwhile, serious violations of international
humanitarian and human rights law by government forces and
the armed opposition continue to be documented and pose
familiar questions regarding accountability and reparation. The
result is well-known: actors that are essential to end the conflict
are the ones that have been involved in abuses and are to be
held accountable. Therefore, calls for justice, accountability and truth create incentives to
resist the conclusion of and adherence to an agreement.
Legal Demands After Gross Human Rights Violations
In light of crimes such as torture, enforced disappearances, sexual violence, and mass
killings demands for justice and accountability are prevalent. Transitional justice is the
conceptual expression that responds to this demand by providing the tools to address a
legacy of large-scale abuses, avoid impunity, ensure accountability, serve justice, realise
reconciliation and guarantee memorialization. This set of tools – criminal prosecution,
reparations, truth-seeking, vetting, dismissals and institutional reform – emerged in
response to the different nature of each incident of abuse and appreciates the context-
dependent nature of “justice”, “accountability”, and “reconciliation”. At the same time, a
legal framework – in form of victim rights and state obligations – crystallized that sets out
the minimum standards of such a response:
victims’ access to justice,
the duty to impartially and promptly investigate violations,
the right to truth about causes and circumstances pertaining to the victimization and
the fate of victims,
the reparative right to restitution, compensation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition, and
the duty to prosecute certain crimes.
A combination of transitional justice mechanisms adapted to the needs in Syria could
realise these standards. However, to develop and implement a corresponding strategy
requires several steps that undermine the political settlement of the conflict.
Documentation, preservation, and analysis of information related to crimes are legally
required. So is the design of an adequate and proportional reparation and institutional
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reform programme. At the same time, the state has to criminally prosecute certain crimes.
All this incentivises perpetrators on both sides and their affiliates to avoid any commitment
to these mechanisms.
Political Compromise and Its Potential Effects on Transitional Justice
A lack of explicit commitments is not the only way how a peace agreement might violate
these minimum standards. The June conference – based on the Geneva communiqué –
will negotiate additional questions that can prove decisive. Negotiated settlements often
address a mixture of security, political, economic and territorial aspects and define how the
power of the corresponding resources is shared in order to stop violence and de-escalate
societal tension. When perpetrators or their supporters control these resources, they can
obstruct transitional justice efforts and impair the state’s ability to respond to abuses.
The communiqué’s call for a transitional government will, in one form or another, entrench
individuals from either side in government structures. This risks handing substantial political
power to those responsible for crimes and enables them to frustrate efforts to address the
past by, for example, granting amnesties.
Similarly, an agreement will likely define the future of the state security apparatus and the
role of the armed opposition within it. As with political power, controlling security resources
can enable the prevention of investigations and arrests or entail the power to break the
peace.
Besides political and security questions, economic and territorial aspects of a compromise
might equally frustrate transitional justice. Especially in view of the self-government
concerns of the Kurdish, or even Alawite community, granting autonomy to certain areas
might be necessary to reach an agreement, but will jeopardize comprehensive
accountability by creating an uneven situation across the country.
Consequently, striking the necessary balance between enabling political compromise and
upholding victim rights and accountability within a political agreement will define the
conditions for success for transitional justice in Syria. Too wide-reaching provisions might
prevent an accord. But discarding transitional justice altogether violates international law
and fails to appreciate victims’ needs. The question is then, without giving up on minimum
standards, which provisions should be included in a political agreement?
Finding the Balance: Protect the Minimum, Enable the Maximum
As the complexities of negotiations prevent precise prescriptions, the main rationale that
can be formulated is twofold: first, to ensure, at the minimum, the necessary conditions to
elaborate a more detailed transitional justice strategy after the agreement and, second, to
enshrine the maximum of immediate mechanisms that do not directly challenge core
interests of the negotiating parties.
The crucial role of investigatory and documentation processes for other transitional justice
mechanisms requires a firm commitment to seek, collect and preserve evidence.
Enshrining the institutional set-up that can investigate in compliance with international
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evidentiary and fair trial standards is a key step for transitional justice. For example,
prosecution initiatives as well as truth-seeking require the preservation of documents and
other evidence.
While the next step of truth-seeking – compiling and analysing information through, for
example, a truth commission – might not be possible, truth in form of identification and
location of the deceased and disappeared can be achieved without impairing the core
interests of the negotiating parties.
In a similar vein, the duty to prosecute the most egregious crimes needs to be reflected by
an accountability commitment within the agreement. This means that it might not be
feasible to define the prosecutorial strategy or set-up of a criminal justice mechanism, but
impunity for international crimes has to be legally excluded.
Lastly, reparation mechanisms should also mirror this twofold consideration. First, a general
commitment to human rights and democratic standards as in the Geneva communiqué
does not entail detailed vetting programmes. It can, however, be the basis for accountability
in subsequent institutional reform processes. Second, reparative mechanisms not
prohibitive for a political settlement should start immediately, for example, rehabilitation and
compensation programmes, initiatives to acknowledge victimization or to prepare
memorialisation.
The precise inclusion of these commitments in a settlement will be context-dependent at
the time of agreement. They illustrate, however, that the variety of transitional justice
mechanisms allows a flexible pursuit of transitional justice goals in a particular context
without discarding them in toto on grounds of political realism. It is possible and necessary
to meet some norms from the beginning and prepare the ground for further accountability
efforts that appear prohibitive at the time of negotiation.
Bringing this legal perspective into the discussion about the political future of Syria might
not only strengthen the position of victims within transition. It might also underline the limits
to current behaviour and future discretionary competence of the players that aim to play a
role in the political arena of post-conflict Syria. Overcoming the utopian picture of legal
rights and duties as well as their light-minded sacrifice for political compromise might allow
to more realistically manage expectations of both perpetrators and victims.
(in einer Langfassung als Editorial des AjV-Newsletters Mai 2013 erschienen)
3/3
